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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 2007, Judge Carol Higbee of the Superior Court of New Jersey
issued a memorandum of decision that stated, “[a] practice has come to the Court’s
attention that appears to have the potential to create manifest injustice upon the
∗
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rights of the People of the United States to file in the State Courts cases that
traditionally belong in State Courts.”1 Judge Higbee further characterized the
practice in question as a “strategic-end run” around the state courts and contrary to
the “long standing understanding of the law.”2 She concluded her decision with a
promise to “raise the issue on a wider basis . . . with the . . . proper committees of the
Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey.”3 The practice that Judge Higbee so
strongly denounced has been called pre-service removal.4 It is a procedural
maneuver utilized by defendants in civil actions and best explained by the following
hypothetical lawsuit.
To begin, suppose a citizen of Ohio files a lawsuit against two corporations
seeking damages in excess of $75,000. One corporation is a citizen of New Jersey
and the other is a citizen of Delaware. Diversity jurisdiction exists under this
scenario because the defendants are not citizens of Ohio and the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.5 As such, the federal district courts have
original jurisdiction over this action,6 which permits the plaintiff to file this lawsuit
in federal court. Imagine, however, the plaintiff exercises the option to file this
lawsuit in state court. Specifically, this hypothetical corporation files the lawsuit in
a state court of New Jersey. Named defendants typically may remove an action from
state court to federal court when diversity jurisdiction exists.7 There is one
exception, however, to that rule.8
The exception, known as the forum-defendant rule,9 prohibits removal based on
diversity jurisdiction when one “of the parties in interest properly joined and served
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”10 It seems
then that removal in our hypothetical case would be prohibited because one of the
named defendants is a citizen of New Jersey, the forum state. Nevertheless, a closer
look at the language of the forum-defendant rule reveals an exception to its
applicability. Specifically, the statute requires a “properly joined and served” instate defendant.11

1
In re Bextra/Celebrex, No. ATL-L-8367-05MT (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 03, 2007),
available
at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/archive/bextra-celebrex/MOD_
regarding_Track_Assignment_Notice.pdf.
2
Id.
3

Id.

4
For a discussion on possible congressional solutions to the issue of pre-service removal,
see Jordan Bailey, Comment, Giving State Courts the Ol’ Slip: Should a Defendant Be
Allowed to Remove an Otherwise Irremovable Case to Federal Court Solely Because Removal
Was Made Before Any Defendant Is Served?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 200 (2009).
5

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). See also discussion infra Part II.A.1.

6

See id. § 1332(a).

7

See id. § 1441(a).

8

See id. § 1441(b).

9

See, e.g., Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (N.D. Ohio 2008).

10

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

11

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/7

2

2010]

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND DENIED

909

One could thus argue that removal based on diversity jurisdiction is proper when
executed before the plaintiff has “served” the in-state defendant. Moreover, indeed
numerous defendants have avoided the forum-defendant rule with that approach.12
As evidenced by Judge Higbee’s blistering opinion,13 however, not all courts agree
that pre-service removal is proper. In fact, the issue has resulted in a split among a
number of the United States district courts.14
District courts on one side of the split have authorized pre-service removal
because the plain language of the forum-defendant rule only prohibits removal when
the in-state defendant has been “served.”15 Some district courts on the other side of
the split have rejected pre-service removal by creating an exception to the
applicability of the “properly joined and served” requirement of the forum-defendant
rule.16
Finally, other district courts have rejected pre-service removal by
characterizing the maneuver as an absurd result that Congress could not have
intended.17
This Note will examine all sides of the district court split and ultimately argue in
favor of the plain language of the forum-defendant rule to permit pre-service
removal. Part II of this Note surveys the general removal doctrine, general
principles of statutory interpretation, and the history of the absurd-result principle.
Part III then discusses the district court split in depth by setting forth the arguments
on both sides of the issue. Part IV of this Note contemplates the flawed arguments
against pre-service removal. Part V then concludes with a discussion on why the
plain language argument in favor of pre-service removal is the appropriate resolution
of the district court split.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. The General Removal Doctrine
The general removal doctrine is a creature of statute.18 “It has been a part of
American jurisprudence since the execution of the Judiciary Act of 1789.”19 The
general removal statute specifies that “any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court.”20 In short, an

12

See, e.g., cases cited infra note 98.

13

See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.

14

See discussion infra Part III.A.

15

See discussion infra Part III.A.2.a.

16

See discussion infra Part III.A.1.a.

17

See discussion infra Part III.A.1.b.

18

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-52 (2006).

19

Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644 (D.N.J. 2008) (citations
omitted).
20

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
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action may be removed from state court to federal court if it could have originally
been filed in federal court.21
Two actions commonly removed to federal court are those based on federal
question jurisdiction22 and those based on diversity of citizenship.23 Although the
district courts have original jurisdiction under both scenarios,24 section 1441(b) of
the general removal statute sets forth separate removal guidelines for each. First, an
action removed under federal question jurisdiction, that is, one “founded on a claim
or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.”25 In
diversity cases, however, section 1441(b) “imposes another condition above the
requirements of original diversity jurisdiction.”26 It states “[a]ny other such action
shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”27 This
provision, also known as the forum-defendant rule,28 precludes removal of a diverse
case from state court to federal court when one of the defendants, “properly joined
and served,” is a citizen of the state where the action is filed.29 Although there are
other statutes that provide the right of removal,30 this Note will focus on removal
under diversity jurisdiction and the forum-defendant rule.
1. Diversity Jurisdiction
Diversity jurisdiction exists when “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different States.”31 The amount
in controversy requirement is established by a “fair reading” of the complaint.32 A
party’s citizenship is determined by looking at where that party is domiciled, that is,
the place where the party resides with “an intention to remain there indefinitely.”33

21

See 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1376 (2010) (citing City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997)).
22

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
23

See id. § 1332.

24

See id. §§ 1331-32.

25

Id. § 1441(b).

26

Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug.
10, 2009).
27

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).

28

See, e.g., Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (N.D. Ohio 2008).

29

See, e.g., Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 935 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).

30

16 JAMES WM. MOORE
2009).

ET AL.,

MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 107.02 (3d ed.

31

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006).

32

See, e.g., Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 573 (6th Cir. 2001).

33

Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 250 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
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Corporations have dual citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and
removal.34 A corporation is a citizen of any state where it is incorporated and the
state where they have their principal place of business.35 The Supreme Court
recently concluded in Hertz Corp. v. Friend that the appropriate test for determining
a corporation’s principal place of business is the “nerve center” test.36 Under that
test, a corporation’s principal place of business “refers to the place where the
corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s
activities.”37 It noted the “‘nerve center’ will typically be found at a corporation’s
headquarters.”38
A removing party must still account for the removal prohibition contained in the
forum-defendant rule before it can successfully remove a case under diversity
jurisdiction. The forum-defendant rule precludes removal when any of the parties in
interest “properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.”39 The rationale behind this rule is straightforward: “[g]iven
that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide litigants with an unbiased
forum by protecting out-of-state litigants from local prejudices, it makes no sense to
allow an in-state defendant to take advantage of removal.”40 The removal process
thus can begin once the defendant has established that none of the “properly joined
and served” defendants is a resident of the forum state.
2. The Removal Process
The process for removal is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446. It states that “[a]
defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action . . . from a State court
shall file in the district court . . . [where] such action is pending a notice of removal

34

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).

35

Id.

36

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). In Hertz, two California residents sued
their former employer in state court, alleging violations of California’s wage and hour laws.
Id. at 1186. The defendant corporation sought removal to federal court, claiming that its
principal place of business was in New Jersey. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that defendant’s principal place of business was in
California. Id. at 1186-87. It relied on the “business activity” test to determine that Hertz was
a corporate citizen of California. Id. at 1187. The case was remanded to the state courts. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari emphasizing the need for judicial administration of a
jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as possible. Id. at 1186.
37

Id. at 1186.

38

Id.

39

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006). It is worth noting that the original removal statute did not
contain the “properly joined and served” requirement, which was added in 1948 when
Congress enacted Title 28. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.b.
40

16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 107.14 (3d ed.
2009). See also Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing
that “[t]he purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide a federal forum for out-of-state
litigants where they are free from prejudice in favor of a local litigant,” but that “[t]he need for
such protection is absent . . . in cases where the defendant is a citizen of the state in which the
case is brought.” (citation omitted)).
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. . . containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.”41
Additionally, “[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of
a copy of the initial pleading.”42
At one point, courts were uncertain whether receipt of the complaint unattended
by formal service was sufficient to start the thirty-day removal period.43 The
Supreme Court resolved the issue in Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc.44 There the Court held that formal service of process is required to trigger the
thirty-day removal period under section 1446(b).45 The Court grounded its holding
in the “bedrock principle [that] . . . [a]n individual or entity named as a defendant is
not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a
court’s authority, by formal process.”46
The final wrinkle in the removal process emerges when there are multiple
defendants to an action. All defendants generally must join in the notice of removal
to effectuate that action properly.47 Accordingly, a notice of removal is considered
procedurally defective and invalid if it fails to include or explain the non-joinder of a
codefendant.48 This requirement may be satisfied, however, if the defendants that
did not join in the notice of removal file a written statement to the court indicating
that they consent to removal.49 The removing defendant(s) must then give prompt
written notice of the procedurally sound removal to all adverse parties and “file a
copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal
and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.”50
3. Remand and Other Post-Removal Procedures
A district court may engage in a number of procedures after a notice of removal
has been filed. First, the district court “may issue all necessary orders and process to
bring before it all proper parties whether served by process issued by the State court
or otherwise.”51 Additionally, “[i]t may require the removing party to file with its
clerk copies of all records and proceedings in such State court or may cause the same
41

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).

42

Id. § 1446(b) (emphasis added).

43

See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999).

44

Id.

45

Id. at 347-48.

46

Id.

47

16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 107.41
(Procedures After Removal) (3d ed. 2009) (citing Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Martin,
178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900)).
48

Id. (citing Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Allison, 756 F. Supp. 290, 291 (N.D.
Tex. 1991)).
49

Id. (citing Burr ex rel. Burr v. Toyota Motor Credit Co., 478 F. Supp. 2d 432, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
50

28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2006).

51

Id. § 1447(a).
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to be brought before it by writ of certiorari issued to such State court.”52 The most
significant post-removal procedure that a district court may engage in, however, is
whether to remand the action back to state court.
The provisions for remand are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The first
provision within section 1447(c) is directed at plaintiffs. It specifies, “[a] motion to
remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter
jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal
under section 1446(a).”53 The second provision within section 1447(c) is directed at
the courts. It specifies, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded . . . [and]
[t]he State court may thereupon proceed with such case.”54
The plaintiff ordinarily is the party that moves the court to remand a case.55 A
plaintiff may make a motion to remand based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
if the court did not catch this defect on its own.56 It is more likely, however, that a
plaintiff will move the court to remand the action based on a procedural defect in the
removal process.57
A procedural defect is any defect other than a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.58 An example would be a notice of removal filed after the 30-day time
period set forth in section 1446(b).59 The failure of all defendants to join in the
notice of removal likewise qualifies as a procedural defect.60 The removing party
bears the burden of proof that removal was proper when a procedural defect is
alleged.61 A court may find itself interpreting the various provisions of the removal
doctrine to correctly decide the outcome of a motion to remand. The following
section discusses the general principles of statutory interpretation.
B. General Principles of Statutory Interpretation
The courts of the United States are charged with the responsibility of interpreting
and applying the laws enacted by Congress.62 “When an authoritative written text of
the law has been adopted, the particular language of that text is always the starting

52

Id. § 1447(b).

53

Id. § 1447(c).

54

Id.

55

MOORE ET AL., supra note 47.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id. (citing In re Allstate Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1993)).

59

Id. (citing Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1989)).

60

Id. (citing McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1998)
(failure of all defendants to join in removal is procedural defect)); see also id. (citing Roe v.
O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1994)).
61

Id. (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also id. (citing
Parker v. Brown, 570 F. Supp. 640, 642 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
62

73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 60 (2010) (citations omitted).
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point on any question concerning the application of the law.”63 Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts should give those words their plain
meaning in applying that law.64 Where statutory language is ambiguous, however, a
court may interpret those words in a manner that they believe effectuates the will of
the legislature.65 In this respect, “courts may examine the object sought to be
attained by the statute, laws upon the same or similar subjects, and the consequences
of a particular construction.”66
At times, a court may be presented with extrinsic aids, such as the legislative
history of a statute, to assist with interpretation.67 Indeed, the definition of
“legislative history” reads, “[t]he background and events leading to the enactment of
a statute, including hearings, committee reports, and floor debates. Legislative
history is sometimes recorded so that it can later be used to aid in interpreting the
statute.”68 The Supreme Court recently confronted this issue in Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Allapattah Services Inc.69
In that case, the Court was required to interpret the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367
to properly answer “whether a federal court in a diversity action may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the
minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, provided the claims are part of the
same case or controversy as the claims of plaintiffs who do allege a sufficient
amount.”70 One side of the dispute argued that the legislative history of section 1367
would show that Congress did not intend to grant supplemental jurisdiction over
these additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement. The Court disagreed.
Relying mainly on the text of the statute,71 the Court held that section 1367 does
permit federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs
not meeting the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement.72 In doing so, the
Court set forth its position on the use of extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation
when it declared, “the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative
history or any other extrinsic material.”73 The Court believed those materials were

63
2A NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:1 (7th ed. 2009)
(citation omitted).
64

73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 124 (2010) (citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth,
721 N.E.2d 1057 (Ohio 2000)).
65

See Id. § 113 (citing Brown v. Flowe, 507 S.E.2d 894 (N.C. 1998)).

66

See id. (citing U.S. v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986)).

67

See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).

68

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (8th ed. 2004).

69

Exxon, 545 U.S. 546.

70

Id. at 549.

71

In addition to the text, the Court interprets section 1367 in light of other related statutory
provisions and its established jurisprudence. Id. at 567.
72

Id. at 549-50.

73

Id. at 568.
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often unreliable and their use in statutory interpretation can become an “exercise in
‘looking over a crown and picking out your friends.’”74
Conversely, some courts have deviated from the plain language rule where a
literal application of the words produces a result demonstrably at odds with the
intention of its drafters.75 This exception, known as the absurd-result principle76 or
absurdity doctrine,77 “authorizes a judge to ignore a statute’s plain words in order to
avoid the outcome those words would require in a particular situation.”78 In such
cases, one argues that “the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language,
controls.”79
C. A Brief History of Absurdity
“From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the
idea that judges may deviate from even the clearest statutory text when a given
application would otherwise produce ‘absurd’ results.”80 Even Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the better-known proponents of plain language
interpretation,81 has accepted this principle.82 United States v. Kirby,83 one of the
earliest Supreme Court cases broaching the subject,84 is a useful illustration of the
principle in action.
In Kirby, the grand jury of Gallatin County, Kentucky, issued two indictments
against a mail carrier for murder.85 The circuit court of that county then issued
74

Id. (citing Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)).
75

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (citing Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). See also SINGER, supra note 63, § 46:4
(citation omitted).
76

Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd
Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127 (1994).
77

John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003).

78

Dougherty, supra note 76, at 128.

79

See supra note 75.

80

Manning, supra note 77, at 2388 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 953, 986 (1995)).
81

See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
(Amy Guttman ed., 1997).

THE LAW

82
Dougherty, supra note 76, at 128 (“[The absurd result principle] enjoys almost universal
endorsement, even by those who are most critical of judicial discretion and most insistent that
the words of the statute are the only legitimate basis of interpretation.”); see also id. (citing
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting literal interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) because it would
produce an absurd result) (other citations omitted)).
83

United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868).

84

“The absurd result principle . . . is seen in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court
as early as 1819.” Dougherty, supra note 76, at 135 (citation omitted). Kirby was decided in
1868.
85

Kirby, 74 U.S. at 482.
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bench warrants upon those indictments and commanded Kirby, as sheriff of that
county, to arrest the mail carrier and bring him before the court to answer the
indictments.86 Kirby, accompanied by his posse, then entered the steamboat General
Buell and arrested the mail carrier.87 For their effort, the District Court charged the
sheriff and his posse under the ninth section of the act of Congress, of March 3,
1825, which states, “that if any person shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or
retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier, or of any horse or carriage
carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction, for every such offence, pay a fine not
exceeding one hundred dollars.”88
The issue thus presented was whether the lawful arrest of a mail carrier, under a
warrant issued by the local court, was the type of obstruction to the delivery of mail
that Congress had intended to prevent when they enacted the statute.89 The lower
court judges were split on the outcome. Consequently, the case was certified to the
Supreme Court for resolution.90
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the literal application of the statute.91 It
reasoned, “[a]ll laws should receive a sensible construction.” Furthermore, it will
“be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language . . . [t]he reason
of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.”92 The Court concluded:
The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by
Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted, ‘that whoever drew
blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,’ did not
extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in
the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by
Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner
who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner
who breaks out when the prison is on fire—‘for he is not to be hanged
because he would not stay to be burnt.’ And we think that a like common
sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the act of Congress which
punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its
carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail caused
by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for murder.93
It has been suggested that the examples above from Puffendorf and Plowden, used
by the Court to support its holding in Kirby, exist as “the nearest thing we have to a
legal definition of absurdity.”94 Indeed, a troubling aspect of the principle is that
86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id. (citation omitted).

89

Kirby, 74 U.S. at 482.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 487.

92

Id. at 486-87.

93

Id. at 487.

94

Dougherty, supra note 76, at 139.
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“[c]ases using or referring to the principle do not define absurdity, nor do they
specify the kinds of situations where the principle should be applied.”95
III. PRE-SERVICE REMOVAL
A. The District Court Split
As noted by district court Judge Dan Aaron Polster, “[t]he procedural and factual
circumstances in most, if not all cases [of pre-service removal] are essentially
identical.”96 Despite that uniformity, the federal district courts have not been
uniform or consistent in resolving motions to remand that follow the pre-service
removal maneuver.97 The issue dividing the district courts is whether a defendant
may properly remove a case from state court to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction before the plaintiff serves a named in-state defendant, when it could not
do so after service.
Resolving the pre-service removal issue typically turns on how a particular
district court interprets the “properly joined and served” language of the forumdefendant rule. Some courts have upheld pre-service removal because—by choosing
the “properly joined and served” language—“Congress plainly intended to require
service of the complaint . . . to trigger the preclusion of removal by the forum
resident defendant in a diversity case.”98 Conversely, the courts favoring remand
have rejected pre-service removal two ways.99
95

Id. at 128.

96

Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. Ohio 2008).

97

See cases cited infra notes 98, 101-02.

98

See, e.g., Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518 (D.N.J.
Aug. 10, 2009); Carman v. Bayer Corp., No. 5:08CV148, 2009 WL 1649715 (N.D. W. Va.
June 10, 2009); Taylor v. Cottrell, Inc., No. 4:09CV536, 2009 WL 1657427 (E.D. Mo. June
10, 2009); Copley v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-722, 2009 WL 1089663 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2009);
North v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Brake v. Reser’s
Fine Foods, Inc., No. 4:08CV1879, 2009 WL 213013 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2009); Hutchins v.
Bayer Corp., No. 08-640, 2009 WL 192468 (D. Del. Jan. 23, 2009); Vitatoe v. Mylan Pharm.,
Inc., No. 1:08cv85, 2008 WL 3540462 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 13, 2008); Bolin v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., No. 08-60523, 2008 WL 3286973 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2008); Valerio v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 08-60522, 2008 WL 3286976 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2008); In re
Fosamax Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1789, 2008 WL 2940560 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008);
Masterson v. Apotex, Corp., No. 07-61665, 2008 WL 2047979 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2008);
Johnson v. Precision Airmotive, LLC, No. 4:07CV1695, 2007 WL 4289656 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 4,
2007); Ripley v. Eon Labs Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D.N.J. 2007); Yocham v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., No. 07-1810, 2007 WL 2318493 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2007); Cucci v. Edwards,
510 F. Supp. 2d 479 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Waldon v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. C07-01988,
2007 WL 1747128 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2007); Thomson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 066280, 2007 WL 1521138 (D.N.J. May 22, 2007); City of Ann Arbor Employees’ Retirement
Sys. v. Gecht, No. C-06-7453, 2007 WL 760568 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007); Frick v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., No. Civ. 05-5429, 2006 WL 454360 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2006); Massey v. Cassens
& Sons, Inc., No. 05-CV-598-DRH, 2006 WL 381943 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2006); Vanderwerf v.
GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, No. 05-1315, 2005 WL 6151369 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2005); Test
Drilling Serv. Co. v. Hanor Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d 953 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Ott v. Consol.
Freightways Corp. of Del., 213 F. Supp. 2d 662 (S.D. Miss. 2002); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Wensil v. E.I. Dupont De
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1. Motion to Remand Granted
Two “related but slightly different line[s] of cases”100 have emerged from the
courts favoring remand. While the outcome is the same—the court rejects preservice removal and grants the plaintiff’s motion to remand back to state court—the
reasoning for that outcome differs. Initially, the courts that favored remand,
believing they were otherwise bound by the “properly joined and served” language,
created a limited exception to that requirement. That exception applied when the
notice of removal was filed before the plaintiff had served any defendants.101 As the
pre-service removal trend gained steam, however, courts favoring remand then
turned to the more generally applicable absurd-result argument.102 Under this theory,
pro-remand courts reject pre-service removal because Congress could not have
intended that result when it drafted the forum-defendant rule.103
a. The No-Defendant-Served Exception
Some district courts have concluded the “properly joined and served”
requirement of the forum-defendant rule does not apply when the plaintiff has yet to
serve any of the named defendants.104 Thus, the fact that the case was removed
before the in-state defendant was “properly joined and served” is irrelevant. Typical
of these cases is Holmstrom v. Harad.105
There, the plaintiff filed suit on April 25, 2005 in Illinois state court.106 In its
complaint, it named twenty-eight defendants. Two of the twenty-eight defendants
were residents of Illinois, the forum state.107 On May 5, 2005, counsel for the
plaintiff contacted the attorney for one of the named defendants, Peterson, regarding
a possible waiver of service.108 The next day, without further discussion of the
Nemours and Co., 792 F. Supp. 447 (D.S.C. 1992); Republic W. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 765
F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
99
100

See discussion infra Parts III.A.1.a-b.
Ethington, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 864.

101
See, e.g., Holmstrom v. Harad, No. 05-C-2714, 2005 WL 1950672 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11,
2005); Recognition Commc’n, Inc. v. Am. Auto. Ass’n, Inc., No. 3:97-CV-0945-P, 1998 WL
119528 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1998).
102
See, e.g., Ethington, 575 F. Supp. 2d 855; Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F.
Supp. 2d 640 (D.N.J. 2008); Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, No. 07-5045, 2008 WL
2247067 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2008); DeAngelo-Shuayto v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-2923,
2007 WL 4365311 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007); Fields v. Organon USA Inc., No. 07-2922, 2007
WL 4365312 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007); Vivas v. The Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
103

See cases cited supra note 102.

104

See, e.g., Recognition Commc’n, Inc., 1998 WL 119528; Holmstrom, 2005 WL
1950672.
105

Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672.

106

Id. at *1.

107

Id.

108

Id.
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waiver, Peterson, a citizen of Ohio, removed the case to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332.109
On June 6, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand. It argued Peterson’s removal,
based on diversity jurisdiction, was improper because the presence of the two Illinois
defendants triggered the removal prohibition contained in the forum-defendant
rule.110 Peterson countered that removal of the case was proper because the two instate defendants had not been “served” at the time of removal as required by the
“properly joined and served” language of the forum-defendant rule.111 The court
acknowledged the existence of cases where an unserved in-state defendant did not
defeat removal.112 In those cases, the plaintiff had served the removing defendants
before the notice of removal was filed.113 In Holmstrom, however, the plaintiff had
not served any of the named defendants at the time of removal.114
The court thus was presented with an issue that had “received little treatment in
the federal courts: whether, under section 1441(b), the citizenship of a forum
defendant defeats removal when, prior to removal, no defendant has been served or
otherwise appeared.”115 Answering in the affirmative, the court declared the “joined
and served” requirement of the forum-defendant rule aims “to prevent a plaintiff
from blocking removal by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it
does not intend to proceed, and whom it does not even serve.”116 It maintained,
however, that the protection afforded by this requirement only applies to those nonforum defendants already served at the time of removal:
Once served, a defendant may immediately remove an otherwise
removable case without regard to the unserved forum defendant, but the
protection afforded by the “joined and served” requirement is wholly
unnecessary for an unserved non-forum defendant [since] . . . the nonforum defendant stands on equal footing as the forum-defendant [and]
[n]either defendant in that scenario is obligated to appear in court.117
Thus, the citizenship of the unserved in-state defendants defeats removal because the
“joined and served” requirement did not apply at that early stage.118
109

Id.

110

See id.

111

Id. at *2.

112

Id. at *1 (citing McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 813 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001); Stan Winston
Creatures, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Ott v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 662, 665 (S.D. Miss. 2002); Maple Leaf Bakery
v. Raychem Corp., No. 99 C 6948, 1999 WL 1101326, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 1999)).
113

Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672, at *1.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id. at *2 (citing Stan Winston Creatures, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 181).

117

Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2 (citing Murphy Bros. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1999)).
118

Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2.
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b. The Absurd-Result Argument
The current trend among the courts favoring remand is to reject pre-service
removal via the absurd-result principle.119 Under this theory, courts concede that the
“properly joined and served” language of the forum-defendant rule permits preservice removal.120 They look past that language, however, to avoid a result that
they believe Congress could not have intended.121 In their view, modern technology,
such as electronic docket monitoring, has created a “loophole” in the antiquated
language of the statute.122 Therefore, ignoring the “properly joined and served”
language under these circumstances is justified. Additionally, the absurd-result
courts set forth a number of policy arguments in favor of remand.123 A
comprehensive example of these cases is Sullivan v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals.124
In Sullivan, the plaintiff, a citizen of Ohio, sued the defendant, Novartis
Pharmaceuticals (“Novartis”), in New Jersey state court for alleged injuries caused
by using a Novartis product.125 Novartis, a citizen of New Jersey, removed the case
under diversity jurisdiction to federal court before the plaintiff could effectuate
service.126 The plaintiff then filed a motion to remand the case back to state court.127
The plaintiff argued that removal was improper because the presence of an instate defendant—Novartis—prohibits removal under the forum-defendant rule.128
Novartis argued that the case was properly removed despite the forum-defendant rule
because the in-state defendant had not been “served” as the plain language of the
rule requires.129 The plaintiff argued that “applying the plain meaning of section
1441(b), and allowing Novartis—a forum defendant—to avoid the forum defendant
rule merely because it had not yet been served at the time it filed the Notice, would
amount to an absurd result, demonstrably at odds with Congressional intent.”130 The
court found this argument persuasive.
Notwithstanding a split among its own prior decisions on the issue,131 the federal
district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to New Jersey
119

See cases cited supra note 98.

120

See cases cited supra note 98.

121

See cases cited supra note 98.

122

See cases cited supra note 98.

123

See cases cited supra note 98.

124

Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640 (D.N.J. 2008).

125

Id. at 641.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

See id. at 641-42.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 642.

131

Id. at 642-43 (“In Fields v. Organon USA Inc., the court addressed precisely this issue,
finding that the application of the plain meaning of section 1441(b) led to a result inconsistent
with the intent of Congress. The court held that a defendant ‘is subject to the restrictions of
section 1441(b) regardless of whether it had been properly served at the time of removal.’
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state court.132 In doing so, it applied the absurd-result principle. The court thus
“look[ed] beyond the language of the statute in order to avoid an absurd and bizarre
result, and in order to give effect to the purpose of the forum-defendant rule and the
‘properly joined and served’ language.”133
Crucial to the court’s decision was its belief that “Congress added ‘the properly
joined and served’ requirement in order to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal
by joining as a defendant a resident party against whom it does not intend to
proceed, and whom it does not even serve.”134 The court initially noted that the
original removal statute did not contain the “properly joined and served”
requirement.135 Rather, Congress added it in 1948 when it enacted Title 28.136
Accordingly, the court “conducted a thorough examination of the published
legislative history regarding the 1948 changes to Title 28, including review of all
legislative materials available in the Third Circuit libraries in Newark and
Philadelphia and the DC Circuit library in Washington.”137 Despite these efforts, it
failed to locate a “specific statement from Congress or the advisory Committee on
Revision of the Judicial Code . . . regarding the addition of the ‘properly joined and
served’ language.”138
This lack of congressional guidance,139 however, did not discourage the court
from reaching its desired conclusion. On the contrary, it asserted that the underlying
purpose of the “properly joined and served” language was “abundantly clear in light
Several district courts have come to the opposite conclusion, including this court. In Frick,
we found that the language of section 1441 was unambiguous, and that there was no clear
indication that application of the plain meaning would result in an outcome demonstrably at
odds with the will of provision’s drafters.” (citations omitted)).
132

Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 653-54.

133

Id. at 643.

134

Id. at 645. See also Ethington v. Gen Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. Ohio
2008) (“Congress intended the ‘joined and served’ part of the forum defendant rule to prevent
gamesmanship by plaintiffs, who might name an in-state defendant against whom he or she
does not have a valid claim in a complaint filed in state court to defeat otherwise permissible
removal by the non-forum defendant.” (citation omitted)); Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v.
Toys “R” Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The purpose of the ‘joined
and served’ requirement is to prevent a plaintiff from blocking removal by joining as a
defendant a resident party against whom it does not even serve.”).
135

Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (citation omitted).

136

Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 114 (1940); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1948)).

137

Id.

138

Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948) reviser’s notes; H.R. Rep. No. 80-308 (1947), as
reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S., Special Pamphlet: Title 28 at 1692; S. Rep. No. 80-1559
(1948), as reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S., Special Pamphlet: Title 28 at 1675; Letter from Hon.
Albert B. Maris, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and
Chair of the Committee, to Mildrim Thompson, Jr., Esq. (May 10, 1946)).
139

Sullivan also noted that “the Circuit Courts have provided little guidance on the
statutory interpretation of the ‘properly joined and served’ language of section 1441(b), owing
to the fact that the orders of district courts made pursuant to section 1441, generally are not
reviewable.” Id. (citation omitted).
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of the historical development of the policy of the remand provisions, the practical
application of the ‘joined and served’ provision by district courts in recent decades,
and common sense.”140 Interestingly, the court turned to Pullman Co. v. Jenkins,141 a
1939 United States Supreme Court case, to substantiate its position.142
In Pullman, the Supreme Court stated in dictum “where a non-separable
controversy involves a resident defendant . . . the fact that the resident defendant has
not been served with process does not justify removal by the non-resident
defendant.”143 The Court reasoned that although a nonresident defendant joined in
the action may be prejudiced because the resident defendant may not ever be served,
the non-resident defendant should not be entitled to “seize an opportunity to remove
the cause before service upon the resident co-defendant is effected.”144 Sullivan
regarded this discussion as illustrative of the competing policy goals omnipresent in
the pre-service removal issue.145 That is, “whether ‘the non-resident defendant may
be prejudiced because his co-defendant may not [ever] be served,’ and preventing
the non-resident defendant from seizing the ‘opportunity to remove the cause before
service upon the resident co-defendant is effected.’”146 It concluded that the
Supreme Court clearly chose to further the latter policy with its decision in
Pullman.147 Thus, the court viewed its futile probe into section 1441(b)’s legislative
history as a positive. The dearth of legislative intent signaled that Congress did not
add “the properly joined and served” language to reverse the Pullman Court’s
opposition to removal prior to service.148
Sullivan then set forth several additional arguments in support of its contention
that pre-service removal is an absurd result.149 First, the court argued that
conditioning the validity of the forum-defendant rule on a race to see which party
can either serve or remove before the other is “absurd on its face”150 and “serves no
conceivable policy goal.”151 Next, it believed a plain meaning application would
destroy “the plaintiff’s rightful position as ‘master of his or her complaint.’”152 The
court also worried that defendants “could always avoid the imposition of the forum
defendant rule so long as they monitor the court docket and remove the action to

140

Id.

141

Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939).

142

Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 644.

143

Pullman, 305 U.S. at 541.

144

Id.

145

Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 644.

146

Id. (quoting Pullman, 305 U.S. at 541).

147

Id.

148

Id. at 645.

149

See id. at 645-47.

150

Id. at 645-46.

151

Id.

152

Id. at 647.
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federal court before the plaintiff can effect service of process.”153 This “procedural
anomaly,” it argued, threatened to strip the forum-defendant rule of any practical
significance.154 Finally, the court characterized the practice of pre-service removal
as a form of defendant “gamesmanship.”155 Since it was “abundantly clear”156 that
the “properly joined and served” language was added by Congress to prevent
plaintiff gamesmanship,157 it would be demonstrably at odds with congressional
intent to then allow “defendants to engage another type of gamesmanship—a hasty
filing of a notice of removal” before service of the in-state defendant.158
2. Motion to Remand Denied
a. The Plain Language Argument
Pre-service removal is proper under the plain language argument because the
forum-defendant rule, by its text, permits removal of a diverse case when an in-state
defendant is not properly joined and served.159 The district courts that favor this
argument maintain it is their duty to give conclusive effect to the plain or
unambiguous language of any statute.160 And because these courts find the “properly
joined and served” language of the forum-defendant rule unambiguous,161 the
plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to state court is denied. These courts
acknowledge the policy arguments against pre-service removal are compelling, but
ultimately insufficient to overcome the binding rules of statutory interpretation.162
Thomson v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals163 and Bivins v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals164
are two recent examples of the plain language cases.
In Thomson, the plaintiffs, residents of Georgia, filed an eight-count complaint
against the defendants in the Superior Court of New Jersey on December 19, 2006.165
The defendants, all affiliates of Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (“Novartis”),
maintained their principal place of business in New Jersey.166 After filing the
153

Id.

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

See supra note 138.

157

Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 647.

158

Id.

159

See cases cited supra note 98.

160

See cases cited supra note 98.

161

See cases cited supra note 98.

162

See cases cited supra note 98.

163

Thomson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 06-6280, 2007 WL 1521138 (D.N.J. May 22,
2007).
164

Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518 (D.N.J. Aug. 10,
2009).
165

Thomson, 2007 WL 1521138, at *1.

166

Id.
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lawsuit, the plaintiffs attempted to serve Novartis on December 22, 2006, but the
Novartis office was closed.167 They tried again on four other occasions: December
26, 27, 28, and 29.168 Each time the plaintiff’s process server was denied because
nobody was present to accept service on behalf of Novartis due to the fact that the
company was closed for the holidays.169
On December 29, 2006, Novartis removed the action to federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction.170 At that time, the plaintiffs had not served any of the
defendants.171 Novartis maintained they were not aware of the plaintiff’s attempts to
serve process and had received a copy of the complaint on December 28, 2006 from
a private docketing service.172 On January 2, 2007, after the case was removed, the
plaintiffs finally served Novartis.173
Upon notification that its case had been removed to federal court, the plaintiffs
filed a motion to remand, arguing that removal by Novartis, a resident of the forum
state, is prohibited by the forum-defendant rule.174 In addition, because they had not
served any of the defendants at the time of removal, the plaintiffs further argued that
the court should apply the no-defendant-served exception set forth in Holmstrom.175
Additionally, the plaintiffs raised policy arguments characterizing the practice of
pre-service removal as an absurd result.176 Novartis countered by arguing that a
plain reading of the “properly joined and served” language of the forum-defendant
rule sanctions removal so long as the resident defendant had not been served at the
time of removal.177
Ruling on the plaintiff’s motion to remand, the court asserted that its duty when
interpreting statutory language is to “give effect to the will of Congress, and where
its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily
be regarded as conclusive.”178 Under this standard, then, the court asserted that pre167

Id

168

Id.

169

Id.

170

Id. at *2.

171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

Id. at *3.

176

Id. at *4. Addressing the plaintiff’s policy arguments against pre-service removal, the
court reasoned:
Plaintiffs do raise colorable policy arguments that it is unjust that a properly joined
defendant could monitor state court dockets and remove cases prior to being served,
and that it makes little sense to provide a federal forum to an in-state defendant upon
removal of a diversity case, since state courts are certainly as adept as federal courts in
applying state law.
Id.
177

Id. at *3.

178

Id. at *4 (quotations and citations omitted).
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service removal is permitted.179 It reasoned that the “properly joined and served”
language was unambiguous; it plainly requires an in-state defendant to be “served”
before removal is prohibited.180 Furthermore, the court characterized the plaintiffs
policy arguments as “colorable” but insufficient to overcome the court’s duty to give
meaning to the statute’s plain language.181 The court therefore denied the plaintiff’s
motion to remand, holding that Novartis had properly removed the case to federal
court.182
In its opinion, the Thomson court noted, “there is no evidence that Novartis was
actively avoiding service.”183 This seems to suggest that the plain language
argument does have its limits. If a plaintiff were able to prove that a defendant
actively avoided service and then removed the case to federal court, the “properly
joined and served” language would not protect the defendant. Under those
circumstances, the court would likely characterize the outcome as an absurd result
and grant the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to state court. As
mentioned, there was no evidence in Thomson, however, that Novartis actively
avoided service from the plaintiff.184
A more recent decision out of the plain language courts is Bivins v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals.185 The procedural and factual circumstances in Bivins are almost
identical to Thomson and all other pre-service removal cases.186 The Bivins case is
interesting, however, because both parties relied on earlier decisions from the New
Jersey district court to support their respective positions. The plaintiff cited to
Sullivan as controlling and the defendant relied on Thomson.187
The Bivins court, like Thomson, found the statutory language of the forumdefendant rule clear and unambiguous.188 It too held that removal is only prohibited
179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518 (D.N.J. Aug. 10,
2009).
186
On March 4, 2009, the plaintiff, a citizen of Texas, filed a lawsuit against Novartis, a
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Id. at *1. The complaint was
filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Id. It alleged injuries that resulted from using a
Novartis product. Id. On March 10, 2009, Novartis removed the case to federal court under
diversity jurisdiction before the plaintiff could serve any of the defendants. Id. After serving
Novartis, the plaintiff moved the court to remand the case back to state court. Id. It argued
that the presence of an in-state defendant, Novartis, “violated the ‘forum defendant rule’
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).” Id. The defendant countered with the plain language
argument, insisting removal was proper since it was not served at the time of removal. Id.
187

Id. at *1 (“Both plaintiff and [Novartis] cite decisions within this District to support
their positions.” (citing Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643-47
(D.N.J. 2008) (finding removal was improper); Thomson, 2007 WL 1521138, at *4 (finding
removal was proper))).
188

Id. at *2.
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when an in-state defendant has been “properly joined and served.”189 In so doing,
the court rejected the holding in Sullivan.190 It was reluctant to look past the plain
language of the forum-defendant rule in the “absence of an ‘extraordinary showing
of a contrary congressional intent in the legislative history.’”191 Thus, the failure of
the Sullivan court to show any actual congressional intent in support of its holding
was fatal to the plaintiffs in Bivins.192 Accordingly, the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s policy arguments as insufficient to overcome the binding rules of statutory
interpretation.193 Bivins concluded, “‘if congress intends a different result, it is up to
Congress rather than the courts to fix it.’”194
The plaintiff in Bivins later filed a second motion to remand based on new
facts.195 The new facts presented by the plaintiff were completed service of process
on October 12, 2009, 216 days after Novartis filed for removal.196 The plaintiff
argued that removal was now improper under the forum-defendant rule because
Novartis was “properly joined and served.”197 The court stated that it had a duty to
“decide a motion to remand upon the facts present at the time the petition for
removal from state to federal court is filed.”198 And because Novartis was not
“served” at the time of the petition for removal, the plaintiff “fail[ed] to present any
new information that would . . . [provide] a legal or factual basis for finding removal
improper.”199 The court thus rejected the plaintiff’s argument and denied the second
motion to remand.200
IV. CRITICIZING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRE-SERVICE REMOVAL
A. Revisiting the No-Defendant-Served Exception
The no-defendant-served exception to pre-service removal is founded on the
theory that the “properly joined and served” language was included in the statute to
protect non-forum defendants from plaintiffs who defeat diversity jurisdiction by
189

Id. (quoting Thomson, 2007 WL 1521138, at *4).
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Id.
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Id. (citing Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998)).

192

Id.

193

Id. (“Plaintiff also makes the policy argument that courts should not reward defendants
who monitor electronic dockets and remove cases before plaintiffs have a chance to serve
them. However, these arguments alone are insufficient to overcome the requirement that this
Court give meaning to the plain language of the statute.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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Id. (quoting North v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269-70 (M.D.
Fla. 2009)).
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Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp, No. 09-1087, 2010 WL 1463035, at *1 (D.N.J. April
12, 2010).
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Id. (citing Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir.1985)).
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fraudulently joining in-state defendants, whom they never actually serve nor intend
to proceed against.201 Therefore, that language does not apply when the plaintiff has
yet to initiate service of process on any of the named defendants. The rationalization
for this exception suffers from a number of weaknesses.
First, the actual text of the forum-defendant rule does not support the theory that
the “properly joined and served” language only applies under certain circumstances.
It simply states that “[a]ny other such action shall be removable only if none of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought.”202 Nowhere in this provision does it say or even
imply that the applicability of the “properly joined and served” requirement is
subject to the condition that the removing party has been served. Furthermore, there
is no evidence that Congress intended these words to be dependent upon service of
the removing party.203 Therefore, the courts employing this exception have
essentially deleted the “and served” language from the forum-defendant rule.
Additionally, the theory that the “properly joined and served” language was
added to prevent fraudulent joinder is founded upon a presumption. Although the
words “properly joined” clearly support this argument, there is simply no evidence
that Congress intended the “and served” portion as anything other than an additional
requirement, exclusive of the joinder requirement.204 It is difficult, then, to accept an
interpretation of the forum-defendant rule that ignores certain words contained
therein based on an assumption of congressional intent.
Finally, the Holmstrom court relied upon the holding in Murphy Bros. to
illustrate that the in-state defendant and non-forum defendant(s) stand on equal
footing since neither has been served.205 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
the 30-day removal period does not start running against named defendants until
they have been formally served.206 In support of that holding, the Court reasoned
that “an individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by
formal process.”207 Some plaintiffs in pre-service removal cases have maintained
that Murphy Bros. established a service prerequisite for removal.208 Under this

201
Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug.
10, 2009).
202

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).

203

There is no “specific statement from Congress or the advisory Committee on Revision
of the Judicial Code . . . regarding the addition of the ‘properly joined and served’ language.”
Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (citations omitted).
204

Id.
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Holmstrom v. Harad, No. 05-C-2714, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2 (citing Murphy Bros. v.
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999)).
206

Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 347-48.
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Id.

208

See, e.g., North v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (“Relying on
the Supreme Court’s holding in Murphy Bros., Plaintiff contends that Precision LLC’s
recipient of the Complaint, presumably from the state court’s docket clerk, did not constitute
‘receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading,’ thus
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argument, pre-service removal is improper because the removing defendant was not
yet legally permitted to engage in any form of litigation. Although the Holmstorm
court stopped short of making that argument itself, that interpretation of the holding
in Murphy Bros. is not accurate.
The key word in the Murphy Bros. holding is the word “obliged.” In this
context, “obliged” simply means that a party is not legally required to engage in
litigation until formally served. A party may still engage in litigation, however, if it
so chooses. Therefore, a defendant can still legally file a notice of removal under
section 1446(b) before it is served. The Court therefore stopped short of
“superimpos[ing] a service requirement on Section 1446(b)” in Murphy Bros.209
As mentioned, the Holmstrom court does not explicitly rely on this misconstrued
interpretation of Murphy Bros.210 In any case, the no-defendant-served exception
ultimately fails for other reasons. Specifically, it fails because the language of the
forum-defendant rule does not support its underlying theory that the “properly joined
and served” requirement is dependent upon the foregoing service of the removing
defendant and because it is rooted in presumed congressional intent. For these
reasons, the district courts should not employ the no-defendant-served exception to
avoid pre-service removal.
B. Revisiting the Absurd-Result Argument
The absurd-result argument against pre-service removal also suffers from
inherent flaws in its rationalization. First, the argument that a “literal application of
[the forum defendant rule] . . . would both produce bizarre results that Congress
could not have intended, and results that are demonstrably at odds with objectives
Congress did not intend to effect,”211 also relies upon presumed congressional
intent.212 The act of “look[ing] beyond the language of the statute . . . to give effect
to the purpose of the forum defendant rule and the ‘properly joined and served’
language,”213 likewise is justified by the same unfounded presumption of what
Congress intended those words to mean.214 The fact remains that there is no concrete
evidence to support any theory that Congress added the “properly joined and served”
language to the statute other than to preclude diversity jurisdiction removal when an
in-state defendant has been “properly joined and served.”215 Therefore, district
courts should not rely on mere speculation to justify ignoring the plain language of
the forum-defendant rule.

precluding . . . removal. According to Plaintiff, Precision must have actually served with a
copy of the Complaint and Summons before it could remove.”).
209

Id.

210

See Holmstrom, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2.

211

Sullivan, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (emphasis added).

212

Id. at 643-44.

213

Id. at 643 (emphasis added).

214

See supra note 203 and accompanying text.

215

See supra note 203 and accompanying text.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/7

22

2010]

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND DENIED

929

Additionally, some courts favoring remand have found support in the 1939
Supreme Court case Pullman Co. v. Jenkins.216 They argue this case promulgates the
Supreme Court’s stance on the issue of pre-service removal.217 Specifically, reliance
is placed on the Pullman Court’s reasoning that although a nonresident defendant
joined in the action may be prejudiced because the resident defendant may not ever
be served, the nonresident defendant should not be entitled to “seize an opportunity
to remove the cause before service upon the resident co-defendant is effected.”218
Despite this seemingly applicable dictum from the Pullman case, one court ruling in
favor of pre-service removal has argued that these courts have “taken Pullman out of
context when citing it as supporting or binding precedent for their holdings.”219 This
potential misconstruction of Pullman therefore weakens the position that the
Supreme Court necessarily is against pre-service removal.
The absurd-result courts also set forth a number of policy arguments to support
their characterization of pre-service removal as such. They argue that conditioning
the validity of the forum-defendant rule on the timing of service of process serves
“no conceivable public policy goal.”220 They also maintain that allowing pre-service
removal would “eviscerate the purpose of the forum defendant rule and a plaintiff’s
well-established right to choice of forum.”221 Lastly, these courts characterize preservice removal as a form of litigant gamesmanship.222 They argue that Congress
added the “properly joined and served” language to the forum-defendant rule to
prevent plaintiffs from engaging in gamesmanship by fraudulently joining in-state
defendants to defeat diversity jurisdiction.223 Therefore, because Congress has
already condemned one form of litigant gamesmanship under the forum-defendant
rule, allowing pre-service removal, another form of gamesmanship, would be an
absurd result.
The absurd-result argument suffers from the fact that prior “[c]ases using or
referring to the principle do not define absurdity, nor do they specify the kinds of
situations where the principle should be applied.”224 This lack of clarity makes it
difficult to draw the line between an absurd result and one that is merely
objectionable. Therefore, courts that employ the absurd-result argument do so
without having to satisfy a strict standard. Considering the power that this principle

216

See discussion supra Part III.A.1.b.
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See discussion supra Part III.A.1.b.
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219
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trigger the limitation of § 1441(b).” (citing Ott, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 664-65)).
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carries,225 it is debatable whether the standard should be so lenient. As such, preservice removal, while potentially objectionable, might not rise to the level of
outrage that would warrant the use of the absurd-result principle. To support this
conclusion, it is worth revisiting the outcome in United States v. Kirby.226
In that case, a sheriff was charged for violating a statute that proscribed any
activity obstructing the delivery of mail when it arrested a mailman who was
indicted for murder.227 It was clear to the Court that Congress could not have
intended to include that particular result in the statute.228 Otherwise, mailmen would
be free to commit crimes because no sheriff would want to risk arresting them for
fear of violating the statute. Kirby cited to other examples of absurd results to
analogize its own conclusion. For instance, “‘that whoever drew blood in the streets
should be punished with the utmost severity,’ did not extend to the surgeon who
opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit.”229 Furthermore,
“that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a
prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire—‘for he is not to be hanged
because he would not stay to be burnt.’”230
The results above were all wildly unreasonable and illogical. Moreover, an
innocent person in each situation would have been incarcerated and deprived of their
freedoms without the operation of the absurd-result principle. Conversely, preservice removal does not result in the criminal detention of an innocent person.
Rather, it deprives a plaintiff from litigating their case in state court. While this right
is no doubt important, it is questionable whether it warrants the use of the absurdresult principle. Perhaps if the behavior by the defendant were a bit more egregious,
such as actively avoiding service from the plaintiff before removing,231 then use of
the principle would be justified. Accordingly, the district courts facing this issue in
the future would be better served by allowing Congress to remedy this result if it
sees fit. Otherwise, the standard for employing the principle is further relaxed and
we could see an increase in the frequency of judges reading particular words out of a
statute. Under that scenario, separation of powers issues could arise with
accusations of judges legislating from the bench.
V. ARGUING FOR PRE-SERVICE REMOVAL
The plain language argument in favor of pre-service removal, unlike those
against it, rests on straightforward reasoning. First, the general rules of statutory
interpretation maintain that where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the courts should give those words their plain meaning when applying
225
The absurd-result principle allows judges to “deviate from even the clearest statutory
text when a given application would otherwise produce ‘absurd’ results.” Manning, supra
note 77, at 2388. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 986
(1995).
226
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that law.232 Blacks Law Dictionary defines the term “ambiguity” as “[a]n
uncertainty of meaning or intention, as in a contractual term or statutory
provision.”233 To argue that the term “served,” as used in the context of the forumdefendant rule, is susceptible to “uncertainty of meaning or intention” does not hold
up.
Congress, by adding the words “properly joined and served” to the forumdefendant rule, arguably chose to condition the applicability of the removal
prohibition contained therein upon proper joinder and service of the in-state
defendant. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Congress, in its legislative history
or otherwise, intended the service requirement to apply only under certain
circumstances.234 Thus, the plain meaning of those words must be conclusive.
Moreover, allowing pre-service removal under the plain language of the forumdefendant rule is a result consistent with the Supreme Court’s position on statutory
interpretation as set forth in Exxon v. Allapatah.235
Concededly, pre-service removal is a loophole that has emerged as a result of
antiquated statutory language drafted at a time when electronic docket monitoring
and other modern methods of case-notification were not foreseeable. However, that
fact alone does not make pre-service removal an absurd result. Consequently, courts
should not be permitted to modify the forum-defendant rule by eliminating the words
“and served” from its text. As the Supreme Court declared in Exxon, “‘if Congress
intends a different result, it is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix it.’”236
VI. CONCLUSION
On its face, a dispute over whether a case is litigated in state court or federal
court seems trivial. One might also characterize the pre-service removal dispute as
wasteful of judicial resources. Nevertheless, a closer look at the effects removal can
have on the outcome of a case reveals the importance of this issue. For instance, one
article suggested that by removal, “defeats the plaintiff’s forum advantage . . . [by]
dislodging the plaintiff’s lawyer from a familiar and favored forum . . . reversing the
various biases, costs and other kinds of inconveniences, disparities in court quality,
and differences in procedural law that led the plaintiff to prefer state court.”237
Additionally, the statistics show that win rates for plaintiffs in removed cases are
very low.238 Therefore, the outcome of a motion to remand will, at the very least,
232
73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 124 (2010) (citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Smyth, 721
N.E.2d 1057 (Ohio 2000)).
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BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (8th Ed. 2004).
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See supra note 203 and accompanying text.

235
“As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the
legislative history or any other extrinsic material.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568. See also discussion supra Part II.B.
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Bivins v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 09-1087, 2009 WL 2496518, at *2 (quoting
Exxon, 545 U.S. at 565).
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Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 599
(1998).
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modify “the parties’ respective postures for settlement negotiations . . . if the motion
to remand is denied, when plaintiffs may suddenly find themselves with a weak case
for recovery.”239
Litigants on both sides ultimately would stand to benefit from the guidance of the
appellate courts on this issue. That guidance, however, is far off because “orders
remanding cases are ordinarily not reviewable on appeal,”240 and “orders denying
motions to remand aren’t reviewable until a judgment is entered, which may not
happen for years, if ever.”241 The district courts therefore should alleviate some of
the confusion surrounding this issue by reaching a consistent and proper resolution.
For the reasons set forth above, allowing pre-service removal under the plain
language of the forum-defendant rule is the proper resolution of this issue.

34%) . . . .”); id. (citing Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 237, at 581 (“Plaintiffs’ win rates
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